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NOTE
UNITED STATES v. FULLER: A DEPARTURE FROM
PROPERTY VALUATION PRINCIPLES IN EMINENT
DOMAIN
Flint W. Murfitt*
I. INTRODUCTION
No two land parcels are exactly the same. Nor logically can any two
parcels ever be located in the same place. This makes land valuation an
arduous task. Consequently, courts struggle with property valuation
because land parcels rarely if ever possess identical dimensions, attributes,
and characteristics. The unique qualities of land create a dilemma for
courts in subscribing to a standardized valuation technique in condemna-
tion proceedings.
When dealing with property valuation in eminent domain cases, we
look to the United States Constitution for guidance. The Fifth Amendment
states:
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."'
These words seem clear, uncomplicated and easy to understand. In United
States v Fuller, the United States Supreme Court drove a wedge into the
words "just compensation," creating a plethora of fragments and
splinters.
Courts consider various Criteria to establish fair and equitable or just
compensation as required by the Fifth Amendment.' Property location and
its proximity to adjoining land is a primary consideration in determining
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. V
2. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
3. U.S. CONsT. amend V
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property valuation,4 but in Fuller, the United States Supreme Court
created a paramount exception to the long standing location component of
property valuation. Fuller arose from a condemnation proceeding follow-
ing which the Court refused to consider value enhancement to private
property as a result of the property's proximity to public grazing land.5 The
Court essentially disregarded the location element in establishing a value
for the private land.
The future effect of this decision restricts land owner's rights since it
departs from general valuation principles in eminent domain cases. The
exception allows the government greater freedom to deny just compensa-
tion in other situations and circumstances. It dilutes the meaning of just
compensation in the Fifth Amendment and is an extreme detriment to the
private land owner.
This comment seeks to present general principles of property valua-
tion with a focus on the location component of the valuation equation.
Accordingly, the location issue will be presented via the opinions of the
United States Supreme Court. The United States v. Fuller decision is
summarized and compared to relevant case law. An analysis of the case will
follow with final comments revolving around the ramifications of the
decision.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS IN CONDEMNED PROPERTY
VALUATION
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution creates the
government's power to condemn private property for public use, as long as
it provides just compensation to the owner.' The Court's interpretation of
the Fifth Amendment requires that the taker compensate the owner so as
not to decrease the owner's pecuniary position.7 The owner "is entitled to be
put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken."' 3
The government must pay property owners fair market value for the
condemned land, after considering numerous valuation principles. Courts
measure an owner's value in land "in various ways depending upon the
circumstances of each case". 9 The United States Supreme Court stated
that "no general formula should be used" for valuation purposes.10 Courts
consider various criteria when arriving at a fair market value in cases of
4. McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, 345 (1935).
5. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1933).
8. Id.
9. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1942).
10. Miller, 317 U.S. at 374.
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eminent domain takings, including the probable price arrived at in a fair
negotiation between a.willing seller and buyer." The time of the taking is
also relevant in the valuation process. 2 Additionally, courts also consider
the location of the land, its proximity to other property"3 , and the.potential
for lost profits. 4 Courts also look to see if governmental policy affects the
market value of the property. Here, there must be a showing that the policy
would be considered by the willing buyer and seller in a property
transaction.' Finally, Courts consider the land's future use, provided that
the use is probable and in the near future.'
When the Court cannot value property according to these principles,
it deems the market value standard inappropriate to the actual value." In
difficult situations the Court uses other theories to properly determine
value allowing greater latitude in the admissability of non-traditional
evidence.' 8
It is important to note the definition that the Internal Revenue Service
gives to property valuation in the context of estate and gift taxes. The "fair
market value is the price at which the property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts ... taking into account the location of the item wherever
appropriate."' 9
III. THE TAYLOR GRAZING ACT AND VALUE OF CONDEMNED
PRIVATE LAND
Congress approved the Taylor Grazing Act with the purpose of
putting public land to its highest use. Under the Act, grazing permits do not
"create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands."20 Though the
permits create no formal property rights or interests in the land, they
remain extremely valuable to ranchers and the livestock industry in
general.2' The granting of the grazing permits assures that the range lands
11. Olson, 292 U.S. at 257.
12. Iriarte v. United States, 157 F.2d 105, 110 (1946).
13. Redevelopment Agency v. Garrett, 479 So. 2d 985, 987 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
14. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 344-45 (1893).
15. United States v. Iriarte, 157 F.2d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 1946).
16. McCandless, 298 U.S. at 345 (citing Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1933)).
17. United States v. 190.71 Acres of Land in Lake County, I11., 300 F.2d 52,56 (1962) (quoting
United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945)).
18. Id.
19. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b).
20. 43 U.S.C. § 315b.
21. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488,495 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Hatahley v.
United States, 351 U.S. 173, 177 (1956)),
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are put to the most beneficial use.22
The Court established that land usage in connection with other lands
is appropriately considered in the valuation question if the connection
reasonably affects the market value.2 3 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
specifically addressed the valuation question in a condemnation case
involving private ranch land which adjoined public grazing permit land.2'
It held that the accessibility and availability of adjacent grazing permit
lands was properly allowed in valuing the private ranch.25
IV. THE FULLER DECISION
A. Facts
The United States Government initiated condemnation proceedings
to acquire 920 acres of respondents' 1,280 acres of privately owned land in
western Arizona. The government wanted to construct a dam and reservoir
project at that location.26 The respondents operated a cow-calf ranch on
their land and utilized 31,461 acres of adjoining public land for grazing
purposes. They obtained exclusive grazing rights to the public land by a
permit granted under the Taylor Grazing Act.27 Because of the respon-
dents' location to the grazing lands they remained the only private
landowners that qualified for the permits.28 Under the Act, the grazing
permit could be revoked at any time.2 9 The government did not revoke the
respondents' grazing permits although it intended to use a small fraction of
the public land for the reservoir project .3 At trial the respondents
presented property values to the jury which included the element of
location of the ranch land. They asserted that the value of their private land
was enhanced by its adjoining location to the permit lands, even though the
government could revoke the permit.31 They conceded that the permits
themselves were not compensable, but that on the open market their
private land would command a higher price due to the actual or potential
use of the permit lands. 32
The district court allowed the respondents' valuation into evidence, 33
22. Id.
23. McCandless, 298 U.S. at 345 (citing Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1933)).
24. United States v. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 300, 301 (10th Cir. 1951).
25. Id. at 302.
26. Id. at 489.
27. Id.
28. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 495 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting).
29. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 489.
30. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 495 (Powell, J., dissenting).
31. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 489.
32. Id.
33. Id.
[Vol. 1 2
UNITED STATES v. FULLER
and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court
decision. 34 The Ninth Circuit held that the jury could consider the
combined use of the parcels in the condemnation valuation as long as they
were cautioned that the permits for the grazing land could be withdrawn
without compensation at any time.35
B. Holding
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and
stated that "the Fifth Amendment does not require the Government to pay
for that element of value based on the use of respondents' fee lands in
combination with the Government's permit lands."'3 6 It held that Congress,
through the issuance of a permit under the Taylor Grazing Act, did not
intend to create compensable property rights in the permit lands them-
selves.37 Further, it did not believe that Congress authorized "compensa-
tion for the value added to fee lands by their potential use in connection
with permit lands. ' 38 Based on that interpretation, the Court denied the
compensation requested by the respondents.
V. ANALYSIS AND REASONING OF THE FULLER DECISION
A. The Location Issue
The Court characterized the conflict in this case as a disagreement
over the enhanced value to private land due to its potential or actual use in
combination with grazing land classified under the Taylor Grazing Act.39
This characterization focuses on the combirfed use of the lands and fails to
fully acknowledge the importance of location in the valuation equation.
The proximity of the two parcels and consequent value are the real issues of
the Fuller case.4" Previously, the Court stated that in making an estimate
of market value, "there should be taken into account all considerations that
fairly might be brought forward and reasonably be given substantial
weight" in negotiations between a willing and buyer and seller.4 The
Court seems to ignore its own general valuation principles by refusing to
consider the property location element in the valuation process. Certainly,
a buyer considers the location of real property important if not critical in
34. United States v. Fuller, 442 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1971).
35. Id. at 507.
36. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 493.
37. Id. at 494.
38. Id.
39. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 489.
40. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 503 (Powell, J., dissenting).
41. Olson, 292 U.S. at 257 (citing Brooks Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106, 124
(1934)).
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their decision to purchase almost any property.
B. The Jaramillo and Hatahley Cases
In bypassing the location issue, the Court ignores United States v.
Jaramillo, a case exactly on point.42 In Jaranillo, a private landowner
possessed valid grazing permits to adjoining public land and utilized the
land to operate a cattle ranch.43 The government took the private land
without revoking the grazing permits." The court stated:
In determining the adaptability of the lands as a ranch, it was
therefore proper to take into consideration the availability and
accessibility of the permit land as an appurtenant element of
value for ranching purposes, provided that consideration is also
given to the possibility that the permits could be withdrawn or
canceled by the Government at any time without constitutional
obligation to pay compensation therefor. 5
Further, the court instructed the jury that they could not compensate the
landowner for the permit land since the government already owned this
land. 6 However, they could consider the fact that the landowner possessed
the grazing permits when the government condemned the ranch. The court
ultimately held that it was proper to consider the adjoining permit lands in
arriving at a just compensation figure.47 Despite nearly identical facts, the
Court does not discuss Jaramillo and merely mentions it as a case that the
lower court followed.4 8
The majority avoids the location issue and emphasizes the value added
to the private land due to the grazing permits themselves. However, both
parties in the case agreed that under the Taylor Grazing Act, the
government need not pay compensation for the value of the grazing
permits.49 The Court fails to distinguish between the value of the revocable
permits, which are not compensable, and the location of the land.5" Justice
Powell, in his dissent, included the jury instruction on valuation to
emphasize how carefully the lower court cautioned against consideration
of the revocable grazing permits. Thejury in the lower court was allowed to
consider the natural consequence of the land's location.51
42. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d at 301.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 302.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 490.
49. Id. at 489.
50. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 503 (Powell, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 496-97.
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The Court also seems to overlook its position in Olson when it said that
"[t]he fact that the most profitable use of a parcel can be made only in -
combination with other lands does not necessarily exclude that use from
consideration if the possibility of combination is reasonably sufficient to
affect the market value." 52
The Fuller opinion again takes a detour by placing great importance
on the fact that permit grazing lands are inaccessible to the general public,
somehow mysteriously making them ineligible for compensation. The
Court touts that land located near other Federal property, such as a United
States Post Office, would be compensable because it is accessible to the
public.53
Additionally, the Court failed to speak to its own statement in
Hatahley v. United States: "grazing permits are of considerable value to
ranchers and service a corresponding public interest in assuring the most
beneficial use of range lands."54 Instead, the Court relies on a line of cases
that are not controlling. In one case, the government requisitioned a tug
boat during war times, and would not compensate the owner for the tug's
increased value as a result of the government created demand. 55
The other cases involved the government's navigational servitudes on
waterways. 56 The Court makes a tremendous leap from the water cases,
which contain unique and special governmental privileges and controls, to
permit grazing lands. The Court stretches these principles too far when
seeking to apply them to permit grazing lands.57 The condemnation
proceedings in the water cases are significantly different than the instant
case because they involve governmental changes to the public riverbeds. 58
In Fuller, the government intended to take private land for governmental
use, making no significant changes whatsoever to the grazing land. 59
Consequently, the Court's reading of these cases to include the Fuller
situation is simply too broad.
VI. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS
The future ramifications of the Court's holding presents a sharp sword
52. Olson, 292 U.S. at 256.
53. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 492-93.
54. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 495 (Powell, J., dissenting, citing Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S.
173, 177 (1956)).
55. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
56. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350
U.S. 222 (1956).
57. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 499 (Powell, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 500-01.
59. A small fraction of the grazing lands would also be flooded to complete the reservoir project.
Id. at 495.
1991]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
aimed directly at those who possess private land adjoining public grazing
land. Cattle ranchers, loan institutions and many others rely on the
enhanced value that grazing permits add to adjoining private land. Such
persons carry on business based on the stability of this principle. Certainly
those in the livestock industry are severely disadvantaged as a result of the
Court's holding, but what about future extensions of the exception?"0 Since
the government escaped paying just compensation in Fuller, what limits
apply?
The potential impact of this case brings all types of eminent domain
valuations into jeopardy. Does this mean that whenever public land adjoins
private land, the government will have no responsibility to pay for value
attributed to a favorable location? This proposition conflicts with the Fifth
Amendment just compensation notions and all recognized principles of
land valuation in eminent domain proceedings.
Ironically, despite the Fuller holding, the Court manages to maintain
that the location of property does affect its value. For instance, when
reviewing the constitutionality of city zoning ordinances the Court
acknowledges that the location of some businesses such as adult movie
theaters can adversely affect property values. 1 When faced with a near
identical situation, the Court makes the similar proclamation stating that
zoning ordinances are designed in part to "maintain property values". 2
VII. CONCLUSION
The Fuller holding contradicts long standing notions of equity and
fairness. In adopting the valuation exception, the Court denies owners of
adjacent land equal treatment with respect to compensation for property
taken via eminent domain proceedings. In effect, it holds that the value of
private land adjoining public grazing land cannot be enhanced by its
location. 63 Consequently, the Court treats location value, under these
circumstances, as non-existent.
The Court's pronouncement in Fuller, extracting the primary ele-
ment of location from the valuation equation, is woefully artificial. The
purchasers of land, houses, and other property commonly buy real estate
based strictly on location. The Court disregards this primary consideration
in land ownership and departs from established valuation standards.64 As a
result, there may be no limit to the liberty taken by the Court with regard to
60. The government valued the Fuller's land at $136,500, while the figure the Fuller's expert
witness estimated for the land was over a million dollars. Id. at 504.
61. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc, 427 U.S. 50, 55 (1976).
62. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986).
63. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
64. 2 J. Lewis, Law of Eminent Domain, 1262, third edition.
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Fifth Amendment just compensation in the future.
The purchasers of land adjoining public land who enjoy and pay for
grazing permits suffer greatly because of such disparate treatment. The
livestock industry and other related businesses can no longer rely on this
unstable valuation factor. At a future date, the unfortunate cattle rancher
may accurately be referred to as the one who "bought the farm" but won't
be paid for it, at least not by the United States Government.

